Art vs Design: Saving Power vs Enframing, or A Thing of the Past vs World-Making by Titmarsh, M & Tonkinwise, C
This paper is a dialogue—or, a slice of ongoing 
dialogue; a kind of fight in progress—between  
the authors.
Some background material:
1  Mark is a practicing artist. Cameron is a design 
theorist. Mark is committed to the significance 
of art, Cameron to the significance of design.
2  Mark and Cameron were, for a long time, 
colleagues in a design school. Design is a 
relatively recent profession and not yet a 
discipline. Design schools tend to be either the 
technical, commercial embarrassments of art 
colleges, or the soft, aesthetic embarrassments 
of technology institutes. Because of its 
precarious emergent status, design has a 
defensive enmity with art.
3  What brings Mark and Cameron together, and 
puts them in dispute, is Heidegger and post-
Heideggerian thinking. Both Mark and Cameron 
find in Heidegger a relational post-aesthetics of 
“making think-work”1 that clarifies and furthers 
their attempts to respond to the dominion of 
technological metaphysics. It is just that Mark 
believes that this ‘remembering-clearing’ lies 
on the art side of the art/technology divide 
whereas Cameron believes that it lies on the 
technology side.
The following dialogue is a vehicle for us to 
propose some of the ideas that we are working on. 
For Mark, this is making expanded paintings, for 
Cameron, making engaging things.
Apart from the pragmatic institutional issues 
hinted at above, what is at stake in our debate? 
Perhaps everything; that is to say, if you believe 
Heidegger, at stake is the future of human beings 
in the face of technology’s cessation of history. 
The issue that always troubles readers of 
Heidegger on technology is: if the essence of 
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technology is its totalising nature, how are we 
to respond? If all causal reactions to technology 
remain technological, what is to be done? 
We begin with the assumption that Heidegger 
is misinterpreted when cast as an apologist for 
acquiescence, a quasi-spiritual giving in to, or 
waiting for the end of, techno-being. For example, 
when Heidegger risks this sort of rhetoric around 
the term Gelassenheit, such ‘releasement’ requires 
much effort—one must be active in becoming 
passive. Less extreme, but more common, is 
Heidegger’s valorisation of thinking itself as a 
response to techno-being, in particular, the sort 
of thinking associated with questioning. As is 
often noted, the opening line of his essay “The 
Question Concerning Technology” italicises the 
verb ‘questioning’: “In what follows we shall be 
questioning concerning technology. Questioning 
builds the way” (Heidegger 1977, 3). And the essay 
concludes, 
The closer we come to the danger, the more 
brightly do the ways into the saving power 
begin to shine and the more questioning 
we become. For questioning is the piety of 
thought. (Heidegger 1977, 35) 
However, on these occasions, Heidegger’s 
concern is still for a thinking that is ‘in 
action’. Such questioning is not a removed, 
inactive contemplation, but rather an engaged 
responsiveness. It is, as we will argue, very 
much with and of the process of making. This is 
precisely Heidegger’s point; he aims to retrieve 
a form of making—of thoughtful making, of 
making thoughtful—that is no longer merely 
technological. He does not deny the activism of 
technology, but finds within it more authentic 
forms of revelatory action. This is why the closing 










































Technology” previously cited occur in the  
context of a discussion of art. Let us cite this 
passage at length, because it is the concern of  
the following debate:
Because the essence of technology is nothing 
technological, essential reflection upon 
technology and decisive confrontation with 
it must happen in a realm that is, on the one 
hand, akin to the essence of technology and, 
on the other, fundamentally different from 
it. Such a realm is art. But certainly only if 
reflection on art, for its part, does not shift its 
eyes to the constellation of truth after which 
we are questioning.
Thus questioning, we bear witness to the 
crisis that in our sheer preoccupation with 
technology we do not yet experience the 
coming to presence of technology, that in 
our sheer aesthetic-mindedness we no longer 
guard and preserve the coming to presence of 
art. Yet the more questioningly we ponder the 
essence of technology, the more mysterious the 
essence of art becomes. (Heidegger 1977, 35)
The appropriate response to technology is 
therefore not just philosophising, but thinking in 
and around the making of that which we call art. 
According to Heidegger’s analysis, such making 
think-work appears to be a non-technological way 
of negotiating technology.
To return to our debate, we, the authors, are 
interested in how literally Heidegger should be 
read here. Does ‘art’ mean Art, works for the 
institution of art, or the ars of Design, products 
for the economy of design? Which of these is 
less unthinking in its making, which is more 
thoughtful or thought-provoking? Moreover, 
which is the more appropriate action in response 
to technology, which is nearer the potential for 
swaying the way of the world and therefore more 
able to accomplish a turn in our experience of 
being?
What is at issue in this debate between Mark 
(hereafter M) and Cameron (hereafter C) over 
Heidegger—for this paper, and for the debate 
about practice-based research in which it is 
taking place—is the role and nature of making 
in such thinking. Is the questioning of art that 
Heidegger is calling for a considered analysis of 
the artefactual outcome, the finished artwork or 
design product, or is it a critical reflection on the 
process of making? If the outcome is an artwork 
for interpretative reception rather than a design 
for enactive use, how does this affect the question-
worthiness of the process of making? For, surely, if 
the process of making is a type of research, a way 
of discovering knowledge, then it is thoughtful 
in a way that ignorant technology dangerously is 
not. Such research-ly making reveals exactly what 
technology conceals. To work out how making is 
a bringing-to-knowledge identifies not just why 
there should be a validation of practice-based 
research but also, in the context of Heidegger, 
identifies a non-technological form of making. 
This is why we are fighting over which form of 
making—art or design—is the most significant, 
as research, and as the saving power within the 
eclipsing empire of technology.
C: What is most common in Heidegger’s range 
of articulations of what is to be done is the 
constellation of techne, poiesis, physis, and 
aletheia. The essence of technology derives from 
its origin in the ancient Greek sense of techne, 
the know-how associated with poiesis, which 
Heidegger believes is a mode of revealing, aletheia, 
compatible with the model for revelation, physis. 
This is, in some ways, the first half of “The 
Question Concerning Technology”; poiesis is the 
four ways of occasioning . . . [that] let what 
is not yet present arrive into presencing 
. . . It is of utmost importance that we think 
bringing-forth in its full scope and at the 
same time in the sense in which the Greeks 
thought it . . . Physis also, the arising of 
something from out of itself, is a bringing 
forth, poiesis. Physis is indeed poiesis in the 
highest sense . . . The Greeks have the word 
aletheia for revealing . . . Techne is a mode 
of aletheueuin . . . Technology is a mode 
of revealing . . . And yet the revealing that 
holds sway throughout modern technology 
does not unfold into a bringing-forth in the 
sense of poiesis. The revealing that rules 





















The second half of “The Question Concerning 
Technology” suggests that a response to 
technology involves recovering the poietic 
techne that remains with/in technology as 
challenging-forth.
So, if the techne of poiesis affords a way of 
being with, without succumbing to, techno-
being(lessness), how are we to translate these 
Greek terms? Should we understand the techne of 
poiesis to be the making associated with artwork 
or designing?
M: My side of the argument is perhaps more 
straightforward since Heidegger does explicitly 
and frequently suggest that techne be translated 
as ‘art’. For example, in “The Question Concerning 
Technology”, he writes:
There was once a time when it was not only 
technology alone that bore the name techne. 
Once there was a time when the bringing-
forth of the true into the beautiful was called 
techne. Thus the poiesis of the fine arts was 
also called techne . . . 
Could it be that the revealing lays claim to the 
arts most primarily, so that they for their part 
may expressly foster the growth of the saving 
power, may awaken and found anew our look 
into that which grants and our trust in it? 
(Heidegger 1977, 34–35)
Heidegger makes it clear in “The Origin of the 
Work of Art” that there are two aspects to art’s way 
of revealing that differentiate it from technics. 
The first is that the work that works of art 
accomplish is the founding of worlds. Technology 
reveals, but reveals things to be in a profoundly 
unworldly way.2 What works of art reveal are 
precisely other worlds, other ways of being, other 
clearings in which humans can dwell. They do not 
just reveal these worlds temporarily, they find and 
establish them in a sustaining way. By contrast, 
technology finds nothing but a generic something 
to be transformed into anything; it heeds no prior 
essence that might be holding sway, not even the 
outcomes of its own manufacturing, which it will 
recycle as an energy source just as soon as they 
are completed.3
More significantly, what keeps art from being 
subsumed into technics is that what art reveals are 
concealments. What art brings to the world is what 
Heidegger calls ‘earth’, that is, that which precisely 
resists being brought to the world. Earth ‘shows’ 
itself to be inherently self-secluding. Art points to 
what cannot be revealed. It does not reveal these 
secrets so much as reveal that there are secrets, 
and so they must remain.4 
These concealments are material, and historical; 
they are what one senses as lying beyond, as other 
possibilities. They have to do, quite precisely, with 
the making of the work of art, the origin from 
which the artefact springs or breaks out. These 
earthly qualities are what cannot be completely 
accounted for in any reflection on practice, what 
one glimpses only when one attempts to carefully 
and thoroughly articulate the materialist history 
of a work of art’s making.
This is why, I would suggest, Heidegger insists 
that these hints of a hidden ‘always more’ arrive 
only as “strife”, as a conflictual resistance to the 
drive toward open disclosure, which Heidegger 
calls the ‘world’.
In aesthetic terms, ‘earth’ and ‘world’ are 
similar to notions of form and content but are 
each developed in an extended phenomenological 
sense in their application to works of art. Earth 
identifies both the material aspect of the work, 
what it is made of, and a certain tendency within 
earthly natural things to withdraw, to hide, to 
be elusive for understanding and articulation. 
Similarly, world is not just the totality of objects 
and events but is closer to an environment that 
surrounds us as a matrix of meaningfulness. Nor 
can earth and world be considered separately; 
each is inextricably woven into the other. Earth 
must come through the world to appear at all, 
and the world must rest on the earth and be 
constituted by it. Both are aspects of disclosure, 
are part of an uncanny showing, the creation of 
an open space where something, some thing, can 
come to be. In their strife, each tries to absorb or 
eclipse the other; the world tends to forgetfully 
consume earth and ground, while earth draws the 
world back into its own entropy, to de-historicise 
and de-contextualise. Their conflict is irresolvable 
and leaves a permanently open wound, but this 










































gestalt, a shaping, that brings the work as a work 
into presence. 
Encountering a work of art, one first catches 
sight of earth through the material presence of 
the art form, whether it is the colour of paint, 
the heaviness of marble, or the sound of music. 
Similarly, by virtue of the conflictual union, the 
background nature of the world is brought 
forward and opened up, the world is disclosed. The 
revealed world is an historical world, delimited by 
the kinds of decisions and inchoate possibilities 
that each age defines for itself. Heidegger suggests 
four ages: Greek, medieval, modern, and planetary. 
Planetary is dominated by technology and 
would coincide to some degree with postmodern 
globalisation. As Heidegger suggests, the essence 
of technology is nothing technological; its essence 
is technicity, a mode of relations between all kinds 
of beings that reduces them to mere resources for 
production, machination, and consumption. Yet, 
technicity is not to be rejected outright, since it 
contains the enduring riddle of our age. It is this 
riddle that art reveals, indicates, and instantiates. 
Art’s enduring strangeness, its uncanniness in the 
midst of the demand to be instrumental, is the 
revelation of a riddle. 
To make this more concrete, I would like to 
discuss an example of my own work. In Moraine 
(2006, figure 1), a wheelbarrow spills a load 
of flowers onto a white carpet. The work was 
conceived in the context of a series of paintings 
that were made by pouring or spilling paint onto 
a horizontal sheet of aluminium. The aluminium 
works were made as explorations of alternative 
materials that could be used to make a painting. 
Specifically, canvas is replaced by metal, brushes 
by cake mixing bowls, and images by aleatory 
events. The play of ongoing substitution was 
extended through the cake mixing bowl and 
paint to the wheelbarrow and a load of flowers. 
Wheelbarrow and bowl, paint and flowers, carpet 
and canvas are syntagmatically connected and 





















ultimately perform the same function of delivering 
a load of colour to an impenetrable surface. 
The work exists in an unusual tension between 
what it is and what it is not. Painting is present as 
an absence, a visual absence substituted by smells, 
fragrances, metaphors of painting. The work 
projects the smell of fresh flowers so intensely that 
it touches the nose and all the senses of those who 
enter the gallery. The flowers, like a painting, are 
intensely colourful, and, in this case, synaesthetic, 
giving sight and smell. Synaesthesia becomes a 
metaphor for inter-dimensionality in the work, an 
overflowing of aesthetic and physical boundaries.
The earthiness of the flowers and the 
technological products of wheelbarrow and carpet 
are brought together by a spill, an industrial 
accident, a loss of utility, and, ultimately, a 
spontaneous display of colour. The wheelbarrow, 
like a broken tool separated from the smooth flow 
of usefulness, suddenly stands out, showing the 
unusual shape of all its all elements, the difference 
between its rubber handle, metal legs, and plastic 
tray. One notices that the carpet is unusually 
placed to receive the entire spill—none has gone 
over the edge. The spill as an event of chaotic 
proportions is curiously aesthetic in its relation to 
all the other elements. Yet, both the barrow and 
the carpet are distillations of earthly materials, 
now curiously exposed in the artificially lit interior 
and the conceptually lit domain of art.
On closer inspection, the flowers are a mixture 
of fresh flowers, synthetic flowers, and native 
flowers that have been tinted to intensify their 
natural tones. All the flowers are heads, severed 
from their storks and any obvious supply of 
sustenance. As they die and wilt, they demonstrate 
their liveliness as opposed to the static endurance 
of the barrow and carpet as techno presences.
C: While what M has said about Heidegger is 
clearly true—like a good romantic, Heidegger 
does invest much faith in art as powerful 
respondent to technology—it is important to 
acknowledge that there are at least three caveats 
that Heidegger himself puts in place.
1  The ancient Greek arts “were not enjoyed 
aesthetically. Art was not a sector of cultural 
activity.” The art that is being spoken about is 
ontological precisely to the extent that it refuses 
our current “sheer aesthetic-mindedness” 
(Heidegger 1977, 34). M’s self-description of 
Moraine and its making clearly demonstrates 
the extent to which his work explicitly engages 
with, if not utterly depends on, a certain 
‘aesthetic reception’. I will return to this.
2  The art that is capable of challenging 
technology, which can found worlds by drawing 
on concealed material creative forces, is 
not just any work of art, but only ‘Great Art’. 
Again, M touches on this when acknowledging 
the centrality of history to Heidegger’s 
understanding of art. And it can also be seen 
in the extent to which Moraine involves in its 
making and intended reception an agon with 
the history of art. Nevertheless, the question 
remains whether these elements manage to 
push beyond institutional place-markers (in 
which case they would be susceptible to the 
previous critique of the ‘culture industry’) in 
order to found or at least attest to a wider new 
‘way of the world’.5
3  If techne-as-art can only be understood as Great 
Art, there is more than a chance that such Art 
is a thing of the past, something that existed 
“perhaps only for that brief but magnificent 
time” (Heidegger 1977, 34).
This is why Heidegger does not say that art is 
the appropriate response to technology, but only 
that it may be: “Whether art may be granted this 
highest possibility of its essence in the midst of 
the extreme danger, no one can tell” (Heidegger 
1977, 35).
Because of these caveats and doubts, I think that 
it is important to consider what other pathways to 
dealing with technology might exist. Perhaps what 
Heidegger means by techne is better conceived as 
the sort of making associated with design.
I am already at a disadvantage in arguing this 
way since this Latinate term (Old French dessein, 
to draw; Latin signare, to mark) is one that 
Heidegger does not and would not use. Heidegger 
uses terms that can be productively translated by 
the English word ‘design’, but he is referring to a 
more abstract process of laying out possibilities or 
throwing forth (‘Entwurf’) rather than the process 
of planning the making of things of use.
My side of the debate, therefore, depends 











































I will mention two main aspects of this 
argument, both of which are usefully captured 
by Heidegger’s famous use of Friedrich Hölderlin 
towards the end of “The Question Concerning 
Technology”:
The same poet from whom we heard the 
words
But where the danger is, grows
The saving power also 
says to us:
. . . poetically dwells man upon this earth. 
(Heidegger 1977, 36)
Let me start with the second fragment first. 
Exegetes usually emphasise the adverb poetically 
when discussing Heidegger’s use of this phrase. 
This aligns the saving power with language and 
thought, concerns of the later Heidegger, and 
philosophy in general. However, drawing attention 
to the verb dwell not only fits with Heidegger’s 
later work but also his earlier existential analytic 
of Dasein. It also locates the saving power in 
the things of everyday life, in the pragmata and 
chremata of daily living. This is the much less 
metaphysical locale of design, of designed things, 
and design interactions with things.
It is important to remember that things are the 
ontological indicators. Ontologies are defined by 
how things manifest, by what counts as a thing 
to the peoples dwelling with and through those 
things. This is why the “Question Concerning 
Technology” was originally the third of four 
lectures, the first of which is “The Thing”. Read 
together, these lectures indicate that the crux of 
technics is its denial of things in their thingliness. 
The most famous expression of this is Heidegger’s 
account of nuclear weapons: “The atom bomb’s 
explosion is only the grossest of all gross 
confirmations of the long-since-accomplished 
annihilation of the thing: the confirmation that the 
thing as a thing remains nil” (Heidegger 1971, 170).
This argument is developed most extensively in 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Rainer Maria Rilke:
The object-character of technological 
dominion spreads itself over the earth . . . Not 
only does it establish all things as producible 
in the process of production . . . the thingness 
of things [is] dissolve[d] into the calculated 
market value . . . The frailties of things [are 
being replaced] by the thought-contrived 
fabrications of calculated objects . . . produced 
to be used up . . . the more quickly they are 
used up, the greater becomes the necessity to 
replace them even more quickly . . . [so that 
all that remains] constant in things produced 
as objects merely for consumption is: the 
substitute—Ersatz. (Heidegger 1971, 130)
It is precisely this “injurious neglect of the thing” 
that one realises in the moment of insight into the 
essence of technology. The appropriate response 
to technics therefore lies with 
unpretentious… modestly . . . and 
inconspicuously compliant . . . thing[s]. . . 
Just as it is a part of our unshieldedness 
that the familiar things fade away under the 
predominance of objectness, so also our 
nature’s safety demands the rescue of things 
from mere objectness. The rescue consists 
in this: that things, within the widest orbit 
of the whole draft, can be at rest within 
themselves. (Heidegger 1971, 130)
Design then, the design of everyday things, is a 
fitting response to techno-being. 
Art, as the “Origin of the Work of Art” makes 
clear, also manifests as things, but, for essential 
reasons, as no ordinary things. Works of art are 
very precisely more-than-things, things that 
allegorically transcend their thingness. This 
pretentiousness or immodesty means that art’s 
response to technology is always excessive. It is 
rather “here and now and in the little things that 
we may foster the saving power in its increase” 
(Heidegger 1977, 33).
Let me clarify this further by taking up M’s self-
description of Moraine. 
It is clear from the account of Moraine’s 
making and presentation that M was at all 
times seeking some sort of revelation from this 
constellation of products. He was not seeking 
some sort of representation; indeed, Moraine is 
not the depiction of anything. It would be quite 
inadequate to say (though M’s talk of metaphors 
that make painting presently absent do risk this) 
that it is a representation of painting, or even 




















The rug is not a sign for the canvas, nor do the 
flowers represent the smell of drying paint. 
These things are not signs because they reveal 
too much of themselves to be merely referential. 
They singularly and together become presences, 
showing themselves to be, each in different ways. 
What shines in the work, beyond its reading as 
an installation-based portrayal of painting, is 
a question about how things manifest. Clearly, 
something ontological is going on here.
However, to what extent is this ontologicality 
circumscribed by occurring as art? Are the 
questions that come to those who view M’s work, 
concurring with M’s own account, questions 
that will to any extent trouble those viewers? Do 
these moments of insight into ‘how things are’—
that do seem to be involved in understanding 
Moraine—have any sustainability? While these are 
very designer-ly questions of effectivity, they are 
crucial if we are to take seriously what Heidegger 
says about the historical nature of the revelations 
needed in the face of technics. Does M’s work 
world beyond the artworld? Is there sufficient 
earth-ness to the way this installation has been 
staged in a gallery setting for the questions that 
the work asks to become questions of other 
things elsewhere? Or is this work just turning 
such revelations into a game, an amusement, a 
distraction? Is not this making-being-appear-
pretty-and-witty quintessential Gestell—not in 
the sense of making all available for use but more 
seriously in the sense that Gestell is the frame that 
excludes all other ways of being present? If this 
work does draw attention to a non-productivist-
being-there, doesn’t it do so precisely in the sort 
of way that says that such being-otherwise is now 
only the remit of a museum, a marginal domain of 
practice soon to be a thing of the past? Doesn’t it 
attest to the abandonment of being to questions of 
‘is this or is this not art?’
Surely, all that M has revealed of this work’s 
making would have been better incorporated into 
a commercial product-of-use. A flower-coloured 
wheelbarrow, a wheelbarrow impregnated with 
the smell of flowers, for sale in a hardware store, 
or even more so, in use on a building site, would 
be far more uncanny and question-worthy than 
an art piece. In its everyday use, in use in workday 
settings, it would be much more powerfully (and 
not just much more frequently and pervasively) 
uncanny. Getting it sold would be quite properly 
a design problem, but successfully resolving 
that design problem would have more direct 
and longer-lasting, world-making outcomes. No 
longer delimiting itself to questions of art history, 
it would be freed to afford wider history making.
M: I take C as posing here the idea of marginal 
objects that are not-quite-art and not-quite-
designed-things-of-use. Marginal objects 
furtively seek to survive in sequestered spaces 
somehow outside of global capitalism and the 
levelling effects of Gestell. But, for the moment, 
design, unlike art, is not empowered to produce 
the marginal, since it lives only in the harsh light 
of instrumental production and consumption. 
In such a context, design is the very discipline 
that completes the withdrawal of things. The 
thing, or any object of production, disappears 
in the hands of a consumer because its soft 
embodied presence is completely eclipsed by the 
productivism of use. 
Design as a professional practice only came 
into existence with the flourishing of the machine 
age at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Since then, the task of design has been as the 
slick facilitator and mediator of gritty production 
and consumption. Design is nothing more than 
the sugar coating of technicity, the cool cosmetic 
layer that conceals the ‘set up’ and makes 
destructive things apparently digestible and the 
disappearance of things intensely desirable. 
Alain Findeli captures the essence of design 
as being 
determined by instrumental reason, over-
emphasising the material product, as having 
an aesthetics based exclusively on material 
shapes and qualities, an ethics originating in 
a culture of business contracts, a cosmology 
restricted to the marketplace and a sense 
of time limited to the cycles of fashion and 
technological innovation. (2001, 6) 
While art must also function in the marketplace 
and is inevitably dealt with as a commodity, 
its thingliness is always in play. As a thing, it 
continually reminds us of the work of the work of 
art, which is the ongoing eventful strife between 










































Art as an aesthetic object . . . is obviously 
formed and produced and thus already 
predisposed for commodification but as a 
forcework it opens the different modality of 
an event, irreducible to product. (2004, 15)
The history of the avant-garde and contemporary 
art of the last century has been the reduction 
and abolition of art’s status as a commodity 
and foregrounding of its nature as an event, 
from futurism and dada to happenings, fluxus, 
conceptual art, installation art, and relational art. 
The shift from object to event necessitates 
a reconsideration of art’s relation to 
commodification and exchange: since art 
resists or ‘objects’ specifically by refusing to 
be an object, the most important aspect of 
art’s social relation is the dissolution of the 
related logics of the aesthetic object and the 
commodity. (Ziarek 2004, 105) 
The art market tends to counteract this process 
but that is as it should be. The art market 
continually reminds the artist of the tension 
between economic productivity and the disclosure 
of worlds.
C: Heidegger is very explicit about the fact that 
poiesis not be translated by a manufacturing term: 
What is decisive in techne does not lie at all 
in making and manipulating nor in the using 
of means, but rather in the aforementioned 
revealing. It is as revealing, and not as 
manufacturing, that techne is a bringing-
forth. (Heidegger 1977, 13)
Consequently, techne is not manufacturing, what 
Heidegger in “Contributions to Philosophy” calls 
more generally “machination” (Heidegger 1999, 
88). But this point usefully clarifies what I mean by 
design, as distinct from fabrication. In the quote 
cited above, the “aforementioned revealing” refers 
to the following:
Whoever builds a house or a ship or forges 
a sacrificial chalice reveals what is to be 
brought forth, according to the perspectives 
of the four modes of occasioning. This 
revealing gathers together in advance the 
aspect and the matter of ship or house, with 
a view to the finished thing envisioned 
as completed, and from this gathering 
determines the manner of its construction. 
(Heidegger 1977, 13)
This Platonic-Aristotelian account of techne is 
in fact a rich description of design, or designing 
as thoughtful forethought or foresight. This 
is precisely why design is a mode of revealing, 
a mode of revealing in the lineage of ancient 
Greek techne, within the heart of modern 
manufacturing.
And for the same reason, I am unconcerned 
by M’s suggestion that design might be at the 
very heart of technology. Here I am returning to 
the first of the two Hölderlin quotes to make my 
second main point about why design might be 
best response to technology.
For, the quote indicates not that the danger lies 
near the saving power but that the danger is itself 
the saving power. In a way typical of Heidegger, 
the very acknowledging of technology as a danger 
is the way of saving oneself from the danger. 
The turning is a turning within technology, not 
against it, or outside it. Heidegger is advocating 
a kind of homeopathic remedy, more of the same, 
once one realises that there is a difference within 
that sameness, the difference between design and 
machination, between techne and technology. 
Design is the way that moments of insight can 
be prompted where technology is most at home, 
small turns within sheer instrumentalism that 
afford questioning, if only now and again.
By contrast, art is not similar enough 
to technology. It involves a very different 
comportment, an un-use-ual disposition. Art 
today is, to my mind, still too bound to aesthetics, 
to the aesthetic mode of reception. It still 
requires a Kantian disinterest to be made, to be 
understood and to have valence. This is what 
disengages it from the danger, placing it at a 
remove, especially, but not only, when it exists in 
the protected economy of the gallery.
To this extent, art remains a thing of the past.
M: Even Heidegger allows for the possibility that 
one day Great Art might return and that such a 




















Figure 2 Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby Compass Table 2001, wood, instrument glass, 25 compass needles, 75 x 75 x 35cm. 










































Though Heidegger appears to affirm Hegel when 
he suggests that Great Art is a thing of the past 
(Heidegger 2002, 205), it cannot be extrapolated 
to argue that the present age is entirely artless. 
Great Art has a very specific meaning, referring 
to art that played an overtly fundamental role 
in the life of a culture. Great Art defined cultural 
rituals in early societies and social hierarchies in 
pre-modern societies. For Heidegger, the socially 
determining aspect of art disappeared with the 
Greeks, while, for others, it was lost somewhere 
between post-medieval art and pre-modern art. 
Great Art is equated with pre-modern art 
and anything after that is lesser art, art that is 
simply designed to generate a personal aesthetic 
experience. However, from modernity onwards, 
art becomes something more indefinite and 
elusive, something that proceeds by silence rather 
than public proclamation. In “Origin of the Work 
of Art”, Heidegger discusses a work of modern 
art, a painting by Vincent van Gogh. He proposes 
that a work of art discloses a world. The question 
remains whether all art has the potentiality of 
disclosing a world or whether only Great Art can 
perform that function. 
Krystzof Ziarek substitutes Great Art for ‘radical’ 
art. He concedes that art has lost its “force and 
importance”, and appears to have been replaced 
by the “entertainment industry and information 
technologies” (2004, 1). He continues, “Artworks 
when compared with social, political or even 
physical forces lack any effectiveness in changing 
reality” (Ziarek 2004, 3). The powerlessness of art 
to effect change outside of its own limited domain 
appears conclusive. But ‘power’ is defined in the 
limited terms of technicity. Art’s power, its power 
to reveal, its ‘forcework’, is neither powerful nor 
powerless, but powerfree.
Art discloses an alternative to the paradigms 
of production, mobilisation and technical 
manipulation. . . . The ‘less’ in the adjective 
‘powerless’ when attached to art does not 
necessarily mean lack of power but instead 
indicates an alternative economy of forces . . 
. Though art like everything else is produced 
and regulated within the power driven 
economy of modern being, art can become 
disencumbered of the governing configuration 
of power and open an alternative modality of 
relations. (Ziarek 2004, 3–4)
Ziarek’s term for this kind of power is ‘aphetic 
forcework’, aphetic from aphesis, which means 
releasing, letting be, letting go. 
Art can have such a transformative effect 
only in a specific kind of reception, when 
the artwork is encountered as a work, that is, 
non-aesthetically, which means that, beyond 
its aesthetic commodity form, art is allowed 
to work. Thus the transformative work is itself 
a relation, an encounter with an artwork in 
which this work transforms the web of social 
political and cultural relations with which 
both the work and its reception take place. 
Art’s transformation works not on the level 
of objects, people or things but in terms of 
the modality of relations, which in the forms 
of perception, knowledge, acting or valuing, 
determines the connective tissue of what we 
experience as reality. (Ziarek 2004, 28)
C: I have this suspicion that the model power-free 
artwork for Ziarek, and perhaps Theodor Adorno, 
would be one in a vault, concealed from view. It 
is of course typically instrumentalist to ask after 
‘bum’s on seats’, but Ziarek’s aphetic artworks 
attest to the possibility of a world outside eco-
technics, only if testifying before someone. I 
worry that it is not just Great Art that is a thing 
of the past, but art itself, contemporary art being 
invisible except to those with appropriate levels 
of cultural capital to make it their pastime. Given 
the giganticism of techno-being’s imperialism, 
surely the appropriate response needs to be more 
strategically located if not pervasive.
Let me give a short example to compare 
with M’s account of his own work. In the 1990s, 
Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby developed a 
series of designs as articulations of research into 
electromagnetic radiation. These were relatively 
simple pieces of furniture, such as a coffee 
table with compasses set into it that would map 
electromagnetic fields and fluctuations in a house 
(figure 2). These devices, in quite obvious ways, 
drew attention to a key infrastructure of de-
thinging technics. Electricity is the quintessential 




















results from converting any sort of matter into 
energy (mostly via combustion, but even nuclear 
decomposition), and that can then in turn be 
used in the fabrication of any product. Electricity 
is the alchemical medium that allows any thing to 
be turned into any thing else, a medium therefore 
in which there are no things at all. This is no more 
dramatically evident than in the electromagnetic 
radiation emanating from any electrical device, 
though without designs such as Dunne and Raby’s 
this evidentiality is not evidenced. 
Crucial for this argument with M is that the 
work that these designs do, the revelations they 
accomplish, can only take place in use. These are 
not museum pieces, but pieces that only work 
when lived with. To my mind, then, these are 
exemplary things that reveal injurious neglect of 
things through technology. Only by being in our 
midst and used each day, do they turn us, every so 
often, to the essence of our situation. 
M: C’s commitment to agency is really a form 
of instrumentalism, a version of economic 
rationalism that justifies itself in terms of 
a readily measurable mass audience and 
appropriately calculable outcomes. He is 
compelled to manipulate a situation to get the 
most number of people in the shortest time 
to practice consuming in a certain way. This 
is absolutely essential in certain functional 
situations, such as creating a sustainable practice 
for industrialised societies. However, it is 
counter- productive to establishing an ethics or 
an ontology. 
One of the definitions of art is that it has 
no practical use or is functionless. It is the 
uselessness of art that makes it immune to the 
instrumentalism of technicity. As Adorno writes, 
By crystallising in itself as something unique 
to itself, rather than complying with existing 
social norms and qualifying as ‘socially 
useful’ it criticises society by merely existing, 
for which puritans of all stripes condemn it. 
(Adorno quoted in Ziarek 2004, 41) 
Within the art world, even the instrumentality 
of contemporary economics ceases to function. 
Most artists continue to make their work at 
a loss and finance it by cleaning, teaching, 
labouring. There is something of a pre-industrial 
gift economy at play here. Most governments 
validate the gift economy by accepting the special 
nature of art as something that needs to be 
preserved outside the market economy. They do 
this by nurturing art through ‘gifts’ from funding 
bodies and grant programs. Paradoxically, art 
also functions as a valuable commodity bought 
and sold on a global scale. There is a differential 
dynamic between art, artists, contemporary 
art, investment art, the art world, and the art 
market that defies the imperial drive of techno-
rationalism. 
It is its uselessness that makes art useful.
Art becomes socially “meaningful” precisely 
when it breaks with aesthetic and political 
functions that society establishes for it, when 
it alters the power formations that regulate 
society and that the society wants to stamp 
or project on to art works. Instead, what 
art inaugurates is a different force work, a 
different disposition of forces, which means 
that the relations they produce become 
disposed into a different mode of revealing 
and as a result the world unfolds differently . 
. . The poietic force of art would consist, then, 
in an alternative, non-violent dispositon of 
forces, which does not mean that art becomes 
blind to the “real” world or that it ends up 
in an escapist, aesthetic limbo, but rather 
it instantiates the “same and only world 
otherwise”. (Ziarek 2004, 41–42)
C and M: This debate between us is no doubt 
founded on an unsustainable binary opposition, 
if not asking the wrong question altogether. M’s 
critique of design targets the least interesting 
commercial designs and C’s critique of art targets 
the least interesting institutional works of art. If 
there is a responsive action to technics, it clearly 
lies in something like artful design or designerly 
art. The valence of the examples that we both use 
derive precisely from the interpenetration of art 
and design; M’s artwork with a wayfinding design, 
and Dunne and Raby’s designs with expanded 
artworks. And, of course, the ‘and’ in these kinds 
of ‘art and design’ should be the same ‘and’ that 










































‘and’ signalling the belonging together of what is 
necessarily in strife.
However, this too-easy conclusion should not be 
considered glib. These couplings are placeholders 
for some significant questions to which our debate 
has hopefully drawn attention.
Firstly, there is the issue of aesthesis. If 
Heidegger’s historico-materialism is a post-
aesthetics that can be exemplified in artful 
design and designerly art, it is not therefore a 
non-aesthetics, especially if aesthetics is taken in 
its original sense, as referring to the meaningful 
experience of things. If technology annihilates 
thingliness, then, whether it is art or design, the 
point is for us to recover an ability to sense things, 
to make sense of things. Aesthesis is therefore 
at issue, precisely because, due to Heidegger’s 
“Origin of the Work of Art”, it is no longer 
concealed beneath the metaphysical philosophy 
of aesthetics. The work of Jean-Luc Nancy offers a 
guide to responding to this question.6
Secondly, there is the issue of use. If art’s 
uselessness is nonetheless useful in revealing 
the technological condition, and if the use 
of a designed thing does not only lead to 
the withdrawal of that thing into ready-to-
handedness but to the revelation of thingness 
itself, then we must develop a much more nuanced 
understanding of use. Heidegger indicated as 
much toward the end of his lecture series What Is 
Called Thinking? (1968) but it remains only a hint.
ENDNOTES
1  This phrase is a modification of the title of Mike Hale’s book Living 
Thinkwork: Where Do Labour Processes Come From? (London: CSE Books, 
1980).
2  This is derived from Jean-Luc Nancy’s version of Gestell, ecotechnics. See, for 
example, “War, Law, Sovereignty: Techné”, in Rethinking Technologies, ed. 
Vera Andermatt Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
3  A clear Heideggerian explanation of the essential relation between the 
techne of making and the consumerism of the ersatz is the chapter on 
“Work” in Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1958).
4  For a typically thorough exploration of the logic of the secret, see Jacques 
Derrida’s “Passions: ‘An Oblique Offering’” in On the Name, trans. David 
Wood (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). 
5  On Heideggerian ‘making history’ understood as praticable ‘world making’ 
rather than ‘world history politics’, see Charles Spinosa, Hubert Dreyfus, and 
Fernando Flores, Disclosing New Worlds (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). 
6  See Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1996) and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense of the World, trans. 
Jeffrey Librett (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
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